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Groups and teams are often assumed to have a 
special potential for innovative behavior, and 
hence to be in a unique position to contrib-
ute to organizations’ competitive performance. 
Many studies have therefore addressed the fac-
tors that facilitate or hinder team innovation (see 
Hülsheger, Anderson, & Salgado, 2009; Paulus, 
2008, for recent overviews). One factor that has 
received surprisingly little attention is the issue of  
self-regulation. Teams work in a competitive and 
demanding environment, and have only limited 
resources at their disposal; therefore, they need 
to regulate their collective efforts in order to 
perform effectively and innovatively. Although 
several studies have addressed self-regulation in 
groups (Faddegon, Scheepers, & Ellemers, 2008; 
Faddegon, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2009; Florack 
& Hartmann, 2007; Levine, Higgins, & Choi, 
2000), its effects on team innovation have so far 
been neglected. The current article aims to fill 
this gap by applying Higgins’ (1997) Regulatory 
Focus Theory to organizational teams.
Innovation, or the intentional introduction 
and implementation of  new ideas, processes, 
products, or procedures (West & Farr, 1990), is 
crucial to organizational success: It is through 
innovation that organizations can improve their 
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Much innovative work in organizations takes place in teams. Because organizational demands are 
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performance and gain or retain a competitive 
edge. The starting point of  any innovative proc-
ess is creativity: the generation of  ideas that are 
both original and useful (Amabile, 1996; Sternberg 
& Lubart, 1999; West, 2002). Creative processes 
in groups and teams have been widely studied 
(Brown, Tumeo, Larey, & Paulus, 1998; Nijstad & 
Stroebe, 2006). However, the presence of  creative 
ideas is not enough to come to actual innovation 
(Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006; West, 2002). 
Teams must ensure successful implementation of  
their ideas by promoting and mustering support 
for their ideas, and/or by implementing their 
ideas themselves (Janssen, 2001; Kanter, 1988). 
This requires a commitment to innovation that 
goes beyond idea generation. I argue that self-
regulatory processes are particularly relevant here.
Self-regulation is the process through which 
people align their actions to specific goals, ideals, 
or norms (Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 
2007). Arguably the most influential theory of  
self-regulation at this time is Higgins’ (1997) 
Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT). RFT distin-
guishes between two different modes or foci of  
self-regulation: a promotion focus, in which people 
are predominantly concerned with achievement, 
growth, and the realization of  aspirations, and a 
prevention focus, in which people are predomi-
nantly concerned with security, safety and respon-
sibility. Although to date no studies have 
addressed the effects of  regulatory focus on team 
innovation, two lines of  research suggest that 
such effects are indeed likely to occur.
Regulatory focus and creativity
First, there is work showing that regulatory focus 
affects cognitive processes involved in creative 
performance. For example, Crowe and Higgins 
(1997) argued and found that a promotion focus 
is associated with eagerness, whereas a prevention 
focus is associated with vigilance. This difference is 
often described in signal detection terms: 
promotion-focused individuals strive for maximi-
zation of  hits, and would rather risk a false posi-
tive than a miss (an error of  commission). In 
contrast, prevention-focused individuals strive for 
maximizations of  correct rejections, and prefer 
misses over false positives (an error of  omission) 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Higgins (1997) argued 
that these different tendencies should affect crea-
tivity, and indeed Friedman and Förster (2001) 
found that a promotion focus enhanced (individ-
ual) creative performance on a variety of  tasks. 
Given that any innovation process necessarily 
starts with the generation of  creative ideas, it 
seems plausible that team innovation will also be 
affected by regulatory focus. Moreover, regulatory 
focus has been linked to preferences for stability 
or change, in that promotion-focused individuals 
have been found to be more open to change than 
prevention-focused individuals (Liberman, Idson, 
Camacho, & Higgins, 1999). Since creativity and 
innovation by definition imply change, this again 
supports the notion that regulatory focus will 
affect innovative behavior in organizations.
Regulatory focus and groups
Second, although regulatory focus initially was 
proposed as an individual-level theory, several 
researchers have shown that the theory and its 
predictions also hold on the group level.1 For 
example, Levine, Higgins, and Choi (2000) found 
that promotion-focused groups collectively dis-
played a risky bias in a recognition memory task 
(that is, they were biased towards false positives) 
whereas prevention-focused groups converged 
upon a conservative bias (that is, they were biased 
towards misses). Levine et al. describe this collec-
tive focus in terms of  a shared reality that devel-
ops in groups. Following up on this study, Florack 
and Hartmann (2007) found that prevention-
focused groups were more risk-averse in a simu-
lated investment task than promotion-focused 
groups, both in the content of  their discussions 
and in their subsequent decisions. Similarly, 
Faddegon, Scheepers, and Ellemers (2008) 
manipulated regulatory focus as a social identity 
characteristic in a minimal group paradigm and 
again found that a promotion focus was associ-
ated with a risky bias as compared to a prevention 
focus. Moreover, Faddegon, Ellemers, and 
Scheepers (2009) showed that chronic regulatory 
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focus affected creative group performance in an 
anagram task.
Putting these two lines of  research together, it 
seems highly likely that regulatory focus will 
affect teams’ innovative performance, such that a 
stronger promotion focus is associated with more 
team innovation, whereas a stronger prevention 
focus is associated with less team innovation. 
However, as noted above, innovation is a com-
plex process that comprises several stages or 
activities. This raises the question whether team 
regulatory focus is equally likely to predict all 
aspects of  the innovation process.
Aspects of  innovation
While organizational innovation is not a linear 
process with well-defined goals or endpoints, many 
researchers distinguish between different stages in 
the innovative process (Basadur & Gelade, 2006; 
Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Kanter, 1988; 
Osborn, 1963; Parnes, 1992). There appears to be 
broad consensus that innovation at least requires 
(1) the generation or proposal of  a creative idea by 
organization members; (2) support for the idea, in 
the sense of  agreement that the idea is worthwhile 
and deserves implementation; and (3) actual imple-
mentation and adoption of  the idea. Following ear-
lier work by Janssen (2001) and Kanter (1988), in 
the current article, these activities will be referred 
to as idea generation, idea promotion, and idea 
realization, respectively. Although ‘innovation’ is 
often measured as an aggregate variable (De Dreu 
& West, 2001; Taggar, 2002; Woodman, Sawyer, & 
Griffin, 1993), research suggests that different 
stages of  the innovation process may not always be 
affected by the same variables in the same way. For 
example, West, Sacramento, and Fay (2005) found 
that external demands inhibited team idea genera-
tion, but actually stimulated idea realization. 
Further, Rietzschel, Nijstad, and Stroebe (2006) 
found that differences in idea generation perform-
ance (i.e., quantitative differences between groups 
and individuals) did not lead to differences with 
regard to idea selection. Thus, it is crucially impor-
tant to explicitly distinguish between the different 
stages or aspects of  innovation.
How might team-level regulatory focus relate 
to the above-mentioned three aspects of  team 
innovation? With regard to idea generation, the pre-
diction is fairly straightforward. A promotion 
focus enhances individual idea generation because 
it instills a risky bias (Friedman & Förster, 2001), 
and a collective promotion focus also leads to a 
collective risky bias (Levine et al., 2000). 
Moreover, Faddegon et al. (2009) found that 
groups whose members were more promotion-
focused performed more creatively in a task 
where they had to generate anagrams. Hence, it is 
to be expected that a team’s idea generation activ-
ities will be positively predicted by the strength of  
its collective promotion focus, and negatively by 
the strength of  its collective prevention focus.
Idea promotion refers to the ‘selling’ of  creative 
ideas (Kanter, 1988). This requires willingness to 
invest resources in the innovative process, and a 
strong belief  that creative ideas are worth pursu-
ing further. It is likely that collective regulatory 
focus plays an important role here, because self-
regulation is at the heart of  such investment deci-
sions. The eager striving for achievement 
associated with a promotion focus should cause 
teams to invest time and effort in the promotion 
of  innovative ideas. In contrast, when teams are 
collectively more attuned towards prevention, 
team members probably prefer familiar options, 
which are already known to be effective and 
therefore ‘safe’; hence, such teams should be less 
likely to promote and implement innovative, 
‘risky’ ideas. Florack and Hartmann’s (2007) ear-
lier finding that group regulatory focus affected 
groups’ willingness to invest in risky vs. safe 
options is fully in line with this reasoning; how-
ever, those results were obtained with a simulated 
investment task using ad hoc groups in an artifi-
cial setting. It remains an open question whether 
such effects also pertain to organizational teams’ 
willingness to invest in innovative ideas. It is 
hypothesized here that this is indeed the case; 
thus, a team’s idea promotion activities should be 
positively predicted by its collective promotion 
focus, and negatively by its prevention focus.
Idea realization, finally, refers to the team’s 
success in actually implementing creative ideas. 
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Similarly to idea promotion, this requires a will-
ingness to invest resources in creative ideas. 
However, it is far from obvious that a preference 
for innovative, ‘risky’ ideas and strategies (stem-
ming from a promotion focus) will actually con-
tribute to successful implementation. Ideas that 
do not meet the demands of  everyday reality (e.g., 
because they are too dangerous, too expensive, 
require new technologies that have not yet been 
invented, etc.) are useless, no matter how innova-
tive they are. Moreover, implementation activities 
are always constrained by factors external to the 
team, e.g: constraints with regard to budget, 
organizational priorities, or economic circum-
stances will strongly influence idea realization, 
independently of  the team’s collective focus. This 
inevitably weakens regulatory focus effects on 
idea realization. For these two reasons, it seems 
unlikely that idea realization can be directly pre-
dicted by collective regulatory focus.
In sum, it is to be expected that the level of  a 
team’s collective promotion focus will positively 
predict the team’s idea generation and idea pro-
motion activities; the opposite relationships 
should hold for prevention focus. In contrast, 
idea realization is not likely to be affected by col-
lective promotion or prevention focus. These 




Participants were members and team leaders of  
33 teams in several organizations in The 
Netherlands. In total, 336 people (303 team 
members and 33 team leaders) filled in a ques-
tionnaire. The average age of  the respondents 
was 36.3 years (SD = 9.67), and 36.6% of  the par-
ticipants were female.
Procedure
Participants were asked to participate in a paper-
and-pencil survey, then participants were asked to 
place the questionnaire in a designated (closed) 
box after filling it in. To reduce common source 
bias (Podsakoff, McKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 
2003), two different questionnaires were distrib-
uted: one for team members (containing the col-
lective focus measure) and one for team leaders 
(containing the team innovation measure). 
Although team members were requested to indi-
cate in which team they worked (in order to link 
the member responses to those of  the leaders), 
team leaders did not see the responses of  the 
individual team members.
Measures
Control variables Age and sex of  the team 
members: (mean age of  team members; member 
sex was operationalized as the proportion of  
females in the team), as well as the number of  
respondents per team were measured and 
included as control variables in the analyses, in 
order to reduce irrelevant variance in the inde-
pendent and dependent variables.
Collective focus Collective regulatory focus 
was measured with a scale adapted from Van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans’ (2003) short 
RFQ-p. Originally developed and validated as a 
measure of  individual regulatory focus, this scale 
consists of  14 proverbs capturing a promotion 
focus (e.g., “he who does not dare, does not win”) 
or a prevention focus (e.g., “better safe than 
sorry”). Team members were instructed to indi-
cate how strongly each proverb applied to the 
way their team, as a whole, worked (1 = not at all, 
7 = completely). Reliability was good for the pro-
motion subscale (α = .85), and modest but accept-
able for the prevention subscale (α = .69). For 
both subscales, scores on the separate items were 
averaged into a score for collective promotion 
focus and a score for collective prevention focus. 
Eta squared statistics were sufficiently high to 
warrant aggregation to the team level (η2 = .21 
for both promotion and prevention); therefore, 
for each team the average scores for collective 
promotion and prevention focus were 
computed.
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Team innovation Team innovation was meas-
ured with Janssen’s (2001) 9-item scale, compris-
ing the three subscales idea generation (α = .85; 
example item: “How often does the team come 
up with original solutions for work-related prob-
lems?”), idea promotion (α = .89; e.g., “How 
often does the team mobilize support for innova-
tive ideas?”), and idea realization (α = .82; e.g., 
“How often does the team turn innovative ideas 
into practical applications?”). With each item, 
team leaders were asked to indicate how often the 
team displayed that behavior (1 = “never”; 7 = 




Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations 
for collective focus and team innovation are 
reported in Table 1. Promotion focus was signifi-
cantly correlated with idea promotion; correlations 
with idea generation and idea realization did not 
reach statistical significance. All three subscales of  
team innovation were highly intercorrelated.
Team innovation
To test the hypothesis that collective regulatory 
focus differentially predicted the different 
innovation subscales, I performed a Structural 
Equation Modeling analysis using the statistical 
package EQS 6.1 (Bentler, 1995). I built a model 
with the control variables and promotion and pre-
vention climate as predictors; predictors were 
assumed to be independent, unless they were cor-
related with p < .1 (see Table 1). The three sub-
scales of  the innovation scale were included as 
(correlated) dependent variables. The model 
showed good fit (χ2= 8.11, df = 6, p = .23; CFI = 
.98, SRMR = .09). However, a Lagrange Multiplier 
test showed that fit could be significantly improved 
by including a correlation between sex and collec-
tive prevention focus (χ2 = 4.77, p = .029). The 
revised model showed excellent fit (χ2 = 2.91, 
df = 5, p = .71, CFI = 1, SRMR = .05).
Inspection of  the regression coefficients in 
the revised model showed that, as expected, idea 
generation was positively predicted by collective 
promotion focus (B = .64, SE = .32, t = 1.97, p < 
.05), although not by prevention focus (B = –.48, 
SE = .47, t = –1.03, p > .05). Further, idea 
promotion was positively predicted by collective 
promotion focus (B = 1.08, SE = .31, t = 3.42, p 
< .05), and negatively by collective prevention 
focus (B = –1.09, SE = .46, t = –2.38, p < .05); in 
addition, idea promotion was positively predicted 
by the number of  respondents per team (B = .09, 
SE = .03, t = 2.81, p < .05), and negatively by the 
proportion of  female team members (B = –1.57, 
SE = .67, t = –2.33, p < .05). Finally, idea 
Table 1. Descriptives and correlations










Respondents 9.18 6.57 – .21 .63** −.13 .47** .08 .04 −.10
Age 35.00 5.25 – .00 −.01 .46** .12 .14 .03
Sex .27 .31 – −.09 .29 −.19 −.26 −.26
Prom. focus 4.88 0.58 − .31° .26 .36* .13
Prev. focus 4.29 0.49 − .04 −.05 −.04
Idea gen. 4.37 1.04 − .79* .77*
Idea prom. 4.20 1.16 − .74*
Idea real. 3.89 1.13 −
Note: Maximum value for focus and innovation subscales = 7. N = 33 teams. º = p < .1, * = p < .05, ** = p < .001. 
Respondents = number of  respondents per team. Sex = proportion of  females in team.
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realization was predicted by neither promotion 
nor prevention focus (ts < 1).
Thus, the hypotheses were largely supported: 
both idea generation and idea promotion were 
significantly predicted by the teams’ collective 
regulatory focus; in contrast, this relation did not 
hold for idea realization.
Discussion
Previous research on innovation has largely 
neglected the issue of  team-level self-regulation. 
Similarly, research on self-regulation has neglected 
the issue of  team innovation. The aim of  the cur-
rent study was to fill this gap in the literature by 
showing that collective regulatory focus predicts 
specific aspects of  team innovation. The results 
showed that, as expected, collective regulatory 
focus predicted the degree to which teams gener-
ated creative ideas, as well as their active attempts 
to muster support for these ideas (idea promo-
tion). Also as expected, actual implementation of  
innovative ideas was not predicted by collective 
focus. Moreover, these differing effects of  regula-
tory focus on aspects of  team innovation 
occurred despite the high intercorrelations 
between the three innovation subscales.
The current results highlight the importance 
of  distinguishing between different stages or 
aspects of  the innovative process: Merely analyz-
ing effects of  collective regulatory focus on a glo-
bal measure of  team innovation would not have 
yielded the present pattern of  results, and hence 
would have been less informative. Although stage 
models of  the innovative process are quite com-
mon (Basadur & Gelade, 2006; Kanter, 1988; 
Osborn, 1963), in fact, many studies on team 
innovation employ aggregate measures of  team 
innovation (De Dreu & West, 2001; Taggar, 2002; 
Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). While such 
work is valuable and has led to important insights, 
the current results suggest that important infor-
mation may be lost if  differences between aspects 
or stages of  the innovation process are ignored.
Another important contribution of  this study 
is that it is the first study to demonstrate effects of  
collective regulatory focus on team performance. 
Earlier research has studied effects of  regulatory 
focus on group performance (Levine et al., 2000), 
creativity (Friedman & Förster, 2001), and organi-
zational behavior (Neubert, Carlson, Kacmar, 
Chonko, & Roberts, 2008), but thus far not in 
combination. Given the fact that organizational 
teams are continuously faced with multiple (and 
often conflicting) demands on their limited 
resources, one would expect more attention for 
collective self-regulation in organizations.
It is not immediately clear why team idea gen-
eration was positively predicted by collective pro-
motion focus, but not by prevention focus. 
Similar results were obtained by Faddegon et al. 
(2009); however, Friedman and Förster 
(Experiment 5) found that both chronic foci 
exerted (opposite) effects on individual creative 
performance (using the Gestalt Completion 
Test). This discrepancy in results could be due to 
differences in setting (lab vs organizations) or 
sample (students vs employees). It is also possible 
that idea generation in organizational teams is 
only partly explained by the processes tapped by 
the GCT, and depends to a larger degree on other 
factors (also see Faddegon et al., 2009, for an 
alternative explanation).
Interestingly, the fact that collective focus pre-
dicted idea promotion much more strongly than 
idea generation suggests that team-level self- 
regulation exerts its effects particularly strongly 
on those stages of  the innovation process where 
strategic choices are made regarding the invest-
ment of  resources. Idea generation in itself  is a 
relatively “free” activity that does not require 
much strategic thought; in fact, creative idea gen-
eration may actually be hindered by consideration 
of  strategies and constraints (Osborn, 1963). Idea 
promotion, in contrast, requires that attention is 
directed towards the relative merits of  different 
ideas and to their fit with organizational goals: 
The team has to decide which of  its ideas should 
be promoted. Idea implementation, finally, only 
happens after a strategic decision is made.
Alternatively, it could be argued that idea reali-
zation should be more likely to be affected by reg-
ulatory focus, because of  the “goal looms larger” 
effect.2 For example, Förster, Higgins, and Idson 
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(1998) found that promotion and prevention 
effects on task motivation and engagement 
became stronger when participants were closer to 
goal attainment. Since idea realization by defini-
tion is closer to the attainment of  an innovation 
goal than previous innovation activities, those 
results would suggest particularly strong promo-
tion and prevention effects for this stage. The 
current study found no support for this reason-
ing. One reason for this may be that organiza-
tional innovation is not a linear process with a 
well-defined goal; another possibility is that the 
measure employed in the current study does not 
tap into the specific motivational processes 
addressed by Förster et al. (1998). Moreover, as 
remarked earlier, successful realization of  innova-
tive ideas is constrained by many factors that are 
beyond the team members’ control. However, 
this issue certainly deserves further study.
Strengths and limitations
The current study was a relatively small-scale sur-
vey study; this limits statistical power and makes 
it impossible to draw conclusions regarding cau-
sality. It is possible, for example, that team inno-
vation and collective regulatory focus are both 
influenced by a third variable such as leadership 
style. Further, no actual process data were col-
lected; thus, at this point it is not yet clear how 
collective regulatory focus contributes to team 
innovation, or what role individual regulatory 
focus plays in these team processes.
A strong point of  the study, however, is the 
fact that the dependent variable was measured 
through supervisory ratings, rather than percep-
tions within the teams themselves. This, and the 
fact that meaningful and significant effects (and, 
moreover, a meaningful pattern of  effects) were 
found with a relatively small sample, lend cre-
dence to the results. Nevertheless, they need to be 
replicated and extended before a more solid con-
clusion can be drawn. Future research should also 
address the question how a collective focus 
comes into existence in organizational teams, and 
whether this collective focus is truly stable over 
time or, for example, fluctuates as a function of  
shifting external demands or changes in group 
membership.
Implications
This study shows that collective regulatory focus 
exerts meaningful effects on organizational 
teams, and that it therefore is of  practical as well 
as theoretical interest. Managers who wish to 
improve the innovative performance of  their 
teams would do well to pay attention to the stra-
tegic inclinations that develop in their teams, and 
to be aware of  the multidimensional nature of  
the innovation process. The current results sug-
gest that any intervention aimed at changing the 
collective self-regulatory tendencies within a team 
is most likely to affect the way that team pro-
motes ideas. If  prior analysis of  the team and its 
performance has shown that a team’s weakness 
lies in, say, idea realization, other team variables 
may require more attention.
Conclusion
Organizational teams have to be innovative in a 
complex environment that poses complex 
demands on their limited resources. Hence, self-
regulation is no less important for teams than it is 
for individuals. The current study confirms this 
view by showing that collective self-regulatory 
tendencies can significantly affect specific aspects 
of  teams’ innovative performance.
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